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Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is characterized as a disorder in which patients are
unaware of their contralateral motor deﬁcit. Many current theories for unawareness in
AHP are based on comparator model accounts of the normal experience of agency.
According to suchmodels, while small mismatches between predicted and actual feedback
allow unconscious ﬁne-tuning of normal actions, mismatches that surpass an inherent
threshold reach conscious awareness and inform judgments of agency (whether a given
movement is produced by the self or another agent). This theory depends on a threshold
for consciousness that is greater than the intrinsic noise in the system to reduce the
occurrence of incorrect rejections of self-generated movements and maintain a ﬂuid
experience of agency. Pathological increases to this threshold could account for reduced
motor awareness following brain injury, including AHP. The current experiment tested
this hypothesis in healthy controls by exposing them to training in which noise was
applied the visual feedback of their normal reaches. Subsequent self/other attribution tasks
without noise revealed a decrease in the ability to detect manipulated (other) feedback
compared to training without noise. This suggests a slackening of awareness thresholds
in the comparator model that may help to explain clinical observations of decreased action
awareness following stroke.
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INTRODUCTION
Under normal circumstances we have no difﬁculty in recognizing
our own movements and knowing when we have, or have not, per-
formed an action. However, this can be disrupted following brain
injury or stroke. One such disorder that has been well described
is anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) and is characterized as a
disorder, normally following right hemisphere stroke, in which
the patient is not aware of their contralateral (left) motor deﬁcit
(Jenkinson et al., 2011). Such patients claim to be able to per-
form actions normally despite their obvious paralysis, even to the
extent that when asked to execute an action some can claim to be
doing so when their limb is motionless (paralyzed) at their side
(Ramachandran, 1996).
Most of the current theories explaining AHP focus on for-
ward models originally described to explain motor control. These
forward models incorporate comparators, which compare motor
commands and intentions with actual and predicted sensory feed-
back. Normally the errors detected are small and do not reach
conscious awareness but allow the motor system to correct and
ﬁne-tune our movements (Miall and Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert,
1997). Another role ascribed to the comparators is for the dis-
crimination between Self and Other generated actions (agency
attribution). When the discrepancies detected at the comparators
are large they reach conscious awareness and inﬂuence the expe-
rience of agency (the feeling of causation over an action). There
is a general consensus within theories based on the comparator
model that in AHP, erroneous feelings of agency over actions that
are never executed are based solely on comparisons between intact
intentions and motor predictions. Such that these patients retain
the ability to form motor intentions and produce an efference
copy of the action on which a prediction of the next state of the
motor system is formed. However, due to their paralysis AHP
patients never actually initiate the action. With normal function-
ing of the comparators, the lack of movement from the paralyzed
limb would highlight large discrepancies with that intended or
predicted, thus informing the individual of their paralysis. How-
ever, AHP patients do not appear to detect these discrepancies and
thus remain unaware of their motor deﬁcit.
Exactly why these large discrepancies do not reach conscious
awareness is as yet unclear. Frith et al. (2000) suggested that these
discrepancies are ignored, which may in part be due visual neglect
that is frequently a co-morbid deﬁcit of AHP. This explanation
cannot fully account for this; however, given that double disso-
ciations of neglect and AHP have been identiﬁed (Bisiach et al.,
1986; Jehkonen et al., 2006). Other explanations for ignoring these
discrepancies are not fully described and so difﬁcult to test exper-
imentally. Berti and Pia (2006) suggested that, although the rest
of the comparator functions normally, the comparators monitor-
ing sensory feedback are broken. Although this explains why the
inability to produce movement is not detected, if the comparators
are destroyed it does not adequately account for reinstatement
of awareness, which commonly occurs in AHP after a few weeks
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 456 | 1
Preston and Newport Noisy feedback training impairs agency
(Jenkinson et al., 2011). Recently, a third hypothesis was put for-
ward suggesting that these comparators, rather than being broken,
have pathological slackening of awareness thresholds (Preston
et al., 2010). As stated above, most discrepancies detected by the
comparator model are used for ﬁne-tuning movements and do
not reach conscious awareness and as such it is logical to assume
that there is a threshold that needs to be reached in order to pene-
trate consciousness. It is also logical to assume that any threshold
shouldbe greater than the inherent noise in the system, a threshold,
which is likely to be seriously increased following brain damage.
It was thus suggested that in AHP the threshold is pathologically
increased to the extent that all movements, and indeed no move-
ment at all, do not reach threshold and so are accepted as successful
Self produced actions.
Preston et al. (2010) found support for this theory from a single
AHPpatient,GG. Interestingly it was found thatGG, in addition to
a lack of awareness for his left sided paralysis, was also unaware of
actions produced with his intact (right) arm [an observation that
had only previously been reported anecdotally, Ramachandran
(1995)]. This allowed experimental investigation of comparator
functioning of a moving limb in terms of low-level motor control
as well as high-level awareness of action. It was found that, follow-
ing large spatial perturbations being applied to visual feedback of
his right handed reaching movements, GG was able to make crude
motor corrections to his reaches in an attempt to compensate for
the visual perturbation, whilst remaining unaware of large inaccu-
racies in his movements, any corrective movements he was making
(including large secondary movements), or that any such per-
turbations were applied. A control sample of hemiplegic neglect
patients without AHP did perform worse than young healthy con-
trols, but were able to detect some larger perturbations (unlike
GG who never reported being aware). The fact that GG was able
to make some corrections to his movements, albeit poorly, implies
that the comparators are working to an extent and thus arguing
against broken comparators as suggested by Berti and Pia (2006).
However, as these motor corrections never reached consciousness,
such ﬁndings are in line with a slackening of comparator thresh-
olds – something that was observable to an extent in the neglect
control group, but was extreme in the AHP patient. However, this
was based on observations of a single AHP patient and a small
control group so further research is clearly needed.
The aim of the current study was to further test the threshold
theory of AHP using neurologically intact controls. If comparator
thresholds of motor awareness are governed by inherent noise
in the system (i.e., the threshold should be at least as great as the
noise) increasing noise to feedback of movements made by healthy
controls should serve to increase thresholds and so leading them to
accept greater discrepancies between their actual movement and
the visual feedback as true representations of their actions.
An important factor found to inform judgments of agency
involves conscious motor intention, such that you are more likely
to attribute an observed action as self-generated if it accurately
attains your intended movement goal (e.g., accurately reaches
the target). Systematic visual distortions applied across a series
of reaches can induce motor learning such that adjustments are
made to the motor commands in order to compensate for the
distortions and maintain accuracy of the reach (e.g., Izawa and
Shadmehr,2011). Through suchparadigms, dissociations between
low-level motor planning and high-level motor awareness have
been demonstrated. Gradually increasing systematic distortions
to visual feedback of reaches produces gradual changes in reach
trajectory without conscious awareness to the extent that when
shown veridical feedback of the actual reach participants deny
that it is a true representation of their action (Synofzik et al., 2006;
Preston and Newport, 2010). Thus visual perturbations applied
to feedback of reaches can modulate conscious error detection
(agency) through changes to reach trajectory via unconscious (sub
threshold) motor correction mechanisms. Distortions applied to
the visual feedback of reaches that, rather than being systematic,
are randomly selected from a distribution leads to learning the
mean of that distribution (Scheidt et al., 2001). Therefore if the
mean of the distribution is veridical feedback (no perturbation),
there should be no effect on reach accuracy as participants retain
highest accuracy for unperturbed reaches. Therefore any changes
to observed conscious error detection as a result should not be
an indirect effect of reach accuracy, but a direct modulation of
conscious awareness thresholds.
Participants received visual feedback of reaching movements
using a vBOT roboticmanipulandum. All participants took part in
a self/other detection task similar to that described in Preston et al.
(2010). This was completed after both noise and no-noise training
with each participant. It was predicted that the percentage Self
judgments to visually perturbed trials in the detection task would
increase following noise training compared to following no-noise
training, without any signiﬁcant effect on reach accuracy.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-twoneurologically healthy participants (sevenmales) took
part in the experiment with a median age of 20 years (range 20–
55 years). All were right hand handed and had normal or corrected
to normal vision. The experiment was conducted in accordance
with the local ethics committee and the declaration of Helsinki.
MATERIALS
Participants’ reacheswere represented by themovements of awhite
cursor (20 mm in diameter) that was projected, along with the
target location, onto a horizontal semi-transparent screen posi-
tioned 450 mm above the reaching limb. Participants viewed the
cursor via a horizontal mirror that was positioned equidistant
between the limb and projection such that visual feedback of
their movements appeared in the same spatial plane as the actual
reaching limb (see Figure 1). The location of the cursor was calcu-
lated on-line using position data recorded by a vBOT 2D robotic
manipulandum sampling at 1000 Hz (see Howard et al., 2009 for
a comprehensive description of this device).
PROCEDURE
Participants sat looking down into the mirror and held onto the
vBOT handle with their right hand. Before the beginning of each
trial the vBOT moved the limb to a start location just out of view
and directly in front of the body midline then there was a 500 ms
delay before the trail commenced. At the beginning of each trial
a blue circular target with a diameter of 30 mm appeared for
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FIGURE 1 |The experimental set-up was similar to that described in
Preston et al. (2010). Participants viewed the cursor via a horizontal mirror
that was positioned equidistant between the limb and projection screen
such that visual feedback of their movements appeared in the same spatial
plane as the actual reaching limb.
1000 ms at randomly varying locations on the screen averaging
210 mm forward from the start location and directly inline with
the start position. 200 ms following the disappearance of the target
a tone sounded to indicate that the participants should begin their
reach. The participants then had 1250 ms to complete their reach
before the cursor disappeared and the vBOT move the limb back
to the start location (see Figure 2). Visual feedback of the reaching
movements was represented by the movements of the white cursor
and was either an exact representation of their actual movement
(Self) or had an angular perturbation applied (Other), for which
the angle of the cursor trajectory was rotated relative to the actual
reach trajectory by varying degrees. Other actions were deﬁned as
actions under the control of the computer (i.e., not the same as
the movement performed), as opposed to the actions of another
human being. This was made clear to, and understood by, all
participants prior to the experiment.
The experiment contained two conditions,Noise and No-Noise,
the order of which was counterbalanced between participants. For
each condition participants ﬁrst completed a training block, in
which the experimental variable was modulated (and which dif-
fered between conditions) followed by a judgment block, which
was identical for both conditions. Training blocks consisted of
80 trials in which participants were required to execute reaching
movements whilst instructed only to be as accurate as possible to
the target. For the Noise condition the visual feedback in the train-
ing block was equally divided between –2◦, –4◦, –6◦, –8◦, –10◦, 2◦,
4◦, 6◦, 8◦, and 10◦ perturbations (eight trials per perturbation size,
with negative values indicating leftward perturbations. Degrees of
perturbation refers to the angle between the start and end point
of the cursor trajectory relative to the actual reach trajectory).
In the No-Noise condition, all reaches were veridical to the actual
movements. Judgment blocks consisted of 56 trials equally divided
between –12◦, –8◦, –4◦, 0◦, 4◦, 8◦, and 12◦ perturbations (eight
per perturbation size). Following each reach, participants were
required to make a forced choice verbal judgment as to whether
the visual feedback had been controlled by themselves (Self) or by
the computer (Other). Only trials in which the participant failed
to initiate a reach within the time window were rejected (<2% of
total trials).
Prior to the experimental conditions, participants took part in
three practice blocks in order to familiarized them with the vBOT,
the timing of the reaching movements, and what was meant by
Other visual feedback. The ﬁrst practice block contained 10 tri-
als of only veridical visual feedback (Self trials). For this block
participants were informed that all visual feedback was an exact
representation of their actual reaches and so were not required
to give self/other judgments. The second practice block also con-
sisted of 10 trials but with perturbation sizes of 0◦, 10◦, –10◦, 20◦
and –20◦ (two trails per perturbation). Participants were required
to make a self/other judgment at the end of each trial as in the
judgment blocks. The third practice block consisted of 56 trials
and was identical to the judgment block described above. The trial
order in all the individual blocks was randomized.
RESULTS
SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENTS
The self/other judgment data were converted into a percentage
Self score for each perturbation size (collapsed across left/right
direction) and entered in a 2 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA with
the factors condition (Noise, No-Noise) and perturbation (0◦, 4◦,
8◦, 12◦).
Therewas a signiﬁcantmain effect of condition [F(1,21)= 8.69,
p = 0.008] with the Noise condition having a higher percentage of
Self judgments (mean = 68.71%, SD = 14.24%) compared to the
No-Noise condition (mean = 62.86%, SD = 9.9%; see Figure 3A).
There was also a main effect of perturbation [F(3,63) = 145.89,
p< 0.001] with 0◦ having the greatest percentage of Self responses
(mean = 92.77, SD = 9.81), followed by 4◦ (mean = 85.88%,
SD = 12.86%), 8◦ (mean = 54.91%, SD = 16.7%) then 12◦
(mean = 28.49%, SD = 19.71%). There was no signiﬁcant
interaction [F(3,57) = 1.19, p = 0.321].
REACHING ACCURACY
Mean endpoint and midpoint errors were calculated for reaches in
the judgment blocks for both training and no-training conditions.
Errors were calculated as the angle in degrees between a straight
line from the start point to the target and from the start point to the
cursor position at the end or midpoint of the reach for endpoint
and midpoint errors, respectively. Because of the inclusion of both
left and right sided perturbations, endpoint errors were calculated
as absolute values and then entered in separate 2 × 4 repeated
measures ANOVAs with the factors condition (Noise, No-Noise)
and perturbation (0, 4, 8 and 12◦).
ENDPOINT ERROR
Therewas a signiﬁcantmain effect of perturbation [F(3,63)=204.8,
p < 0.001] with 0◦ having the smallest errors (mean = 2.56◦,
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic of a single trial. 500 ms after the vBOT moved
the limb to the start location a target appeared for 1000 ms followed by
a tone indicating for participants to begin their reach. A white cursor
represented the movements of the real limb and was either an exact
representation of the actual movement (Self ) or had a spatial perturbation
applied (Other ). At the end of the reach participants were required to
give a verbal forced choice judgment as to whether the observed
movement was that of Self or Other.
FIGURE 3 | (A) Percentage of Self judgments was signiﬁcantly higher following Noise training compared to No-Noise training across all perturbation sizes.
(B) Absolute degrees of end point reach error did not differ between the different training conditions. Error bars show SE and ** denotes signiﬁcant
difference < 0.01.
SD = 1.15◦), followed by 4◦ (mean = 3.31◦, SD = 1.13◦), 8◦
(mean = 5.44, SD = 1.73) then 12◦ (mean = 8.4◦, SD = 2.29◦).
Importantly there was no signiﬁcant effect of training condition
[F(1,21) = 1.7, p = 0.206; see Figure 3B] and there was also no
signiﬁcant interaction [F(3,57) = 2.03, p = 0.121].
MIDPOINT ERROR
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of perturbation [F(3,63)= 334,
p < 0.001] with 0◦ having the smallest errors (mean = 3.93◦,
SD = 1.48◦), followed by 4◦ (mean = 4.95◦, SD = 1.02◦),
8◦ (mean = 7.94◦, SD = 0.756◦) then 12◦ (mean = 11.25◦,
SD = 0.698◦). There was no signiﬁcant effect of training con-
dition [F(1,21) = 0.037, p = 0.849] and there was no signiﬁcant
interaction [F(3,57) = 0.665, p = 0.577].
DISCUSSION
The current results demonstrate that following a period of train-
ing in which noise was added to visual feedback, participants were
less able to perceive perturbations to their movements on a subse-
quent detection task: that is, a greater number of trials were judged
by participants as being controlled by themselves (Self) across all
perturbations. This suggests that the threshold atwhichwebecome
consciously aware of discrepancies between our actions and sen-
sory feedback can be increased by introducing noise to the motor
system. It has long been suggested that comparator based forward
models of motor control have a threshold below which discrepan-
cies detected by the system do not reach consciousness (Frith et al.,
2000). Moreover, the fact that we are largely unaware of small cor-
rections to our actions has been consistently demonstrated using
different paradigms (e.g., Goodale et al., 1986; Fourneret and Jean-
nerod, 1998), but this is the ﬁrst demonstration that the level of
unawareness can also be increased at will.
The current data lends support to the threshold theory as an
explanation for AHP. Within current explanations of AHP based
on forwardmodel comparator systems there is a general agreement
that awareness of action in these patients is dictated by motor pre-
dictions rather than sensory feedback. Due to limited experimental
evidence there is disagreement as to why such large discrepancies
caused by hemiplegia go undetected by consciousness awareness.
The threshold theory suggests that such unawareness occurs due
to a pathological slackening of the normal comparator thresh-
olds. Here, it has been demonstrated in neurologically intact
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participants, that the threshold at which a visual/motor mismatch
reaches conscious awareness can be broadened by experimentally
increasing noise of visual feedback. This therefore demonstrates
that consciousness thresholds in the motor system can be manip-
ulated and hence it is plausible that this normal adaptability of
thresholds can be pathologically increased following extensive
brain damage.
In terms of implicated brain regions, AHP does not have a
clear-cut pathology. Unawareness for left sided hemiplegia has
been associated with larger lesion sizes (Orfei et al., 2007) as well
as numerous co-morbid deﬁcits (although none have be found to
fully account for AHP symptomology; Jehkonen et al., 2006). Due
to these factors it is unsurprising that various brain areas have been
identiﬁed in AHP pathology, including frontal parietal networks
(Pia et al., 2004), premotor areas (Berti et al., 2005) and the insula
cortex (Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 2005; Vocat et al., 2010).
Although evidence from healthy controls places the comparator in
the right parietal lobe (Farrer et al., 2003; Preston and Newport,
2008), all of these brain areas have been independently associated
with motor control and/ or action awareness (e.g., Haggard and
Magno, 1999; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003). If AHP
is caused by a pathological increase in awareness thresholds due
to increased inherent noise, this could be a result of damage to
multiple sites associated with action planning and execution and
not just regions speciﬁcally involved with the comparator. There-
fore, extensive lesion sites covering various combinations of motor
related regions, as are associated with AHP, may feasibly result in
a greater increase in noise throughout the entire system, explain-
ing why no single brain area has been uniformly identiﬁed in the
etiology of AHP.
Importantly there was no effect of the noise training on reach
accuracy. Previously it has been suggested that goal attainment
and motor intention (accurately reaching the target) are strong
predictors for judgments/feelings of agency (Farrer et al., 2008;
Preston and Newport, 2010). Indeed post hoc analysis of reach
accuracy for perturbed trails judged as Self vs. those judged
to be Other, ﬁnd the former to be signiﬁcantly more accurate
for both training [t(21) = 6.19, p < 0.001] and non-training
[t(21) = 6.57, p < 0.001] conditions. However, due to the lack
of difference in accuracy between the conditions, the observed
increase in Self judgments following noise training cannot be
explained by participants being more accurate to the target.
This suggests that following noise training, participants accepted
larger reach errors as accurate representations of their own move-
ments; in other words a general broadening of what is accepted
as Self.
Other implications of these results include the interpretation
of agency and movement recognition experiments. Experimen-
tal paradigms that include numerous different perturbation sizes
over the same or several consecutive blocks, by their very nature
increase noise in the visual feedback and so are likely to result in
poorer detection of discrepancies. Similarly, when fewer different
discrepancies are used, detection may become more sensitive. For
example, Preston and Newport (2008) report fewer than 50% Self
judgments for perturbations of 4◦ when only presenting feedback
of 0◦ and 4◦. In the current experiment, however, which uses
a greater number of perturbation sizes, the mean percentage of
Self judgments to a 4◦ perturbation is over 80%, even before noise
training. Moreover, these values are alsodifferent to those observed
by Farrer and colleagues (Farrer et al., 2003, 2008) when using a
broad range of perturbations, but with shorter reach distances
(resulting in relatively smaller end-point errors). Caution must be
applied, therefore, when comparing across different experimental
paradigms.
A possible limitation of the current study concerns implemen-
tation of motor correction during reaching. Because the cursor
was visible throughout the reach, low-level (unconscious) motor
correction mechanisms could have been recruited that main-
tained accuracy to the target despite the visual perturbations –
thereby inﬂuencing self/other judgments. While mean midpoint
errors were larger than endpoint errors, this is to be expected
due the curvature observed in normal reaching. It should also
be noted that any online corrections that may have occurred
were incomplete as both mid and endpoint errors increased with
perturbation size. Moreover, any correction that did occur was
equivalent for both conditions as accuracy at mid and endpoint
were not signiﬁcantly different between training and no-training
conditions. Future studies, however, could further deconstruct
the mechanisms of low and high level processes in motor aware-
ness by modulating the visibility of the cursor at the beginning
and end of the reach. Another consideration for future studies
is to vary the range of noise applied in the training blocks. In
the current study a smaller range of noise was applied in the
training compared to test blocks. This meant that although the
awareness threshold for error detection was expanded it still fol-
lowed the same pattern as under normal reaching conditions,
such that noise inherent in the system (training block) would be
smaller than the range of errors that could occur during every
day reaching (test block). However, with AHP it is suggested
that the thresholds are expanded beyond the inherent noise so
that no perturbations are consciously perceived. Future studies
could investigate the effect of larger noise ranges in the train-
ing blocks relative to test blocks so as to be more comparable to
AHP.
A further point of interest for future research is the role of
oculomotor strategies. Previous studies have shown that eyemove-
ments can effect perception of limb movements (Ariff et al., 2002;
Scherberger et al., 2003). However, to date little is known about eye
movements during agency attribution tasks or during action (and
attempted action) in AHP patients. Monitoring eye movements
during tasks such as that described in the current study with both
healthy and brain damaged participants may help shed light on the
role of eye movements for action awareness and how this might
be effected by noise training.
In conclusion, the current study demonstrates that expos-
ing neurologically intact participants to noisy visual feedback
can reduce their ability to consciously detect visual discrepan-
cies applied to the feedback of their actions in a subsequent
self/other action recognition task. This provides support for the
threshold theory of AHP, which suggests that the disorder may be
causedbypathological slackeningof comparator thresholdswithin
the motor system. These data also have implications concern-
ing experimental models of action awareness given that awareness
thresholds can be so easily manipulated by experimental design.
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